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Until Debt Do Us Part: The Need for Revision of 
Article 2364 Reimbursement Claims for Student Loan 
Debts 
INTRODUCTION 
The day that you have been waiting for your entire life is finally 
here. Today, you will marry your sweetheart, the love of your life, 
and the answer to your every prayer. Today, your $100,000 student 
loan debt is the furthest thing from your mind. However, it may be 
the first thing on your mind if you and your spouse later file for 
divorce. 
Your divorce is bad enough in its own right. You must decide 
who gets the house, the car, and custody of the children. However, 
you may sustain the biggest blow when you least expect it—when 
your spouse files a reimbursement claim to recover $50,000 of the 
money that he or she “contributed” to your student loan debts.1 Even 
though those loans ultimately secured the high-paying job that 
provided the basis for you and your spouse’s elevated standard of 
living, Louisiana’s community property regime makes such a claim 
for reimbursement possible.2 
The offending legislation lies in Louisiana Civil Code article 
2364, which provides a remedy for the non-debtor spouse in the 
event that he or she contributed to a separate debt during the 
marriage: 
If community property has been used during the existence of 
the community property regime or former community 
property has been used thereafter to satisfy a separate 
obligation of a spouse, the other spouse is entitled to 
reimbursement for one-half of the amount or value that the 
property had at the time it was used. 
Considering current trends in student loan debt and marriage, it 
is entirely inequitable to allow one spouse to file a reimbursement 
claim against the other spouse to recover half of the value of the 
debt.3 This is primarily because the spouse claiming the 
reimbursement benefited from the increased standard of living 
during the marriage. Student loan debt is a part of most modern 
marriages and thus a prospective issue at divorce.4 Due to the lack of 
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 1. See discussion infra Part I.B. 
 2. See discussion infra Part I.B. 
 3. See discussion infra Part I.A. 
 4. See discussion infra Part I.A. 
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jurisprudence and specific legislation available to solve this issue, 
Louisiana Civil Code article 2364 must be amended to limit 
reimbursement claims for student loan debt, or alternatively, a 
jurisprudential rule must be adopted in order to ensure equity5 and 
reflect societal expectations.6 
Part I of this Comment discusses current statistics surrounding 
education, marriage, and student loan debt in the United States. It 
also gives an overview of the fundamental aspects of community 
property law in Louisiana. Part II presents Louisiana’s current 
approach to handling reimbursement claims, as well as claims 
specifically dealing with student loan debt.7 Part III explains why 
student loan debt should be the exception to the general rule 
allowing reimbursement claims. It explores the characteristics of 
such debt that make it different and views reimbursement claims for 
student loan debt through the lenses of equity and societal 
expectation. Finally, Part IV proposes that Louisiana must either 
establish a jurisprudential rule or enact legislation that limits 
reimbursement claims for student loan debt. Adopting these 
proposed solutions would ensure that Louisiana’s community 
property laws reflect the current needs of society.  
I. LOVE, MARRIAGE, AND STUDENT LOAN DEBT 
The most convincing evidence of the need for change in 
Louisiana’s treatment of student loan debt lies in statistics. People 
are getting married later in life,8 are better educated when they do 
marry,9 and many enter marriage with student loan debt.10 These 
characteristics of many modern marriages clash with Louisiana’s 
community property law, demonstrating a vital need for change. 
                                                                                                             
 5. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 6. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 7. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2358 (2014) (providing the basis for allowing 
reimbursement claims). 
 8. Sharon Jayson, Sooner vs. Later: Is There an Ideal Age for First 
Marriage?, USA TODAY, http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2008-11-09-
delayed-marriage_N.htm (last updated Nov. 9, 2008) [http://perma.cc/8GDH-
55NL] (archived Mar. 8, 2014) (noting that the age of first marriage has been 
climbing steadily for all racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic groups). 
 9. Hanna Rosin, The End of Men, ATLANTIC, July/Aug. 2010, available at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/print/2010/07/the-end-of-men/308135 [http: 
//perma.cc/6VYD-JXYR] (archived Mar. 8, 2014). 
 10. See Meta Brown, Andrew Haughwout, Donghoon Lee, Maricar Mabutas & 
Wilbert van der Klaauw, Grading Student Loans, FED. RES. BANK N.Y. (Mar. 5, 
2012), http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2012/03/grading-student-loans 
.html [http://perma.cc/WWH8-5UMJ] (archived Mar. 8, 2014). 
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A. Societal Trends in Education and Marriage 
Fifty years ago, the average American family often lived behind 
a metaphorical “white picket fence—one man, one woman, and [a] 
bunch of happy kids.”11 American marriage demographics, 
however, have significantly changed.12 In order to account for these 
changing statistics and their effect on society’s expectations of 
marriage, Louisiana must revise its community property laws. 
The last time that Louisiana revised its law governing 
community property was in 1980.13 At that time, women were 
viewed as “second-class citizens,” while men dominated positions 
of power and influence.14 Unfortunately, Louisiana’s current 
matrimonial regimes law still embraces these antiquated opinions.15 
In the approximately 35 years that have passed since the last 
revision, the role of women in society has changed immensely, 
bringing them out of the home and into the workplace.16 Not only 
have women managed to establish much more equality between the 
sexes, but also, in many respects, they have risen beyond the 
capacities of their male counterparts.17 Women dominate the 
                                                                                                             
 11. Rosin, supra note 9. 
 12. James R. Wetzel, American Families: 75 Years of Change, MONTHLY 
LAB. REV., Mar. 1990, at 4, 5. 
Today, relatively fewer of us are living in family households, and 
particularly in ‘traditional’ nuclear families, than did so earlier in the 20th 
century. The trend toward living in nonfamily households (usually alone) 
is associated with . . . delayed marriage among young adults . . . . 
[E]conomic roles within the family have shifted significantly . . . . In 
particular, regardless of the presence of children, including infants, wives 
now are more likely to work outside the home than to work solely as 
homemakers. 
 Id. 
 13. See KATHERINE S. SPAHT & RICHARD D. MORENO, MATRIMONIAL 
REGIMES § 7:13, in 16 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 562 (3d ed. 2007). 
 14. Rosin, supra note 9. See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 2404 (repealed eff. Jan. 
1, 1980) (“The husband is the head and master of the partnership or community of 
gains; he administers its effects, disposes of the revenues which they produce, and 
may alienate them by an onerous title, without the consent and permission of his 
wife.”). 
 15. In enacting article 121, the Legislature sought to protect women who 
supported their husbands throughout their education, only to be met with divorce 
after their graduations. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 16. See generally Rosin, supra note 9. 
 17. See id. In fact, as of 2010, women hold a majority of the nation’s jobs, 
and they bring home approximately 42.2% of the household income (up from a 
mere 2–6% in 1970), and four in ten mothers are the primary source of income for 
their families. Id. 
Women now hold 51.4% of managerial and professional jobs—up from 
26.1% in 1980. They make up 54% of all accountants and hold about 
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campuses of colleges and professional schools, obtaining three 
bachelor’s degrees for every two attained by men.18 In fact, men are 
now more likely than women to hold only a high-school diploma.19 
These changing demographics are particularly significant 
because, though fewer people are getting married,20 those who do 
marry are older and better educated than in the past.21 The time 
required to obtain higher education leads to a higher age of first 
marriage because more people are waiting to finish their college and 
professional education before getting married.22 The current median 
age for first marriage is the oldest that it has been since the Census 
Bureau began keeping records in the 1890s: almost 26 for women 
and 27 for men.23 The connection between these educational and 
marital statistics demonstrates that couples entering into marriage 
are in a very different position than they were in the past. Observed 
together, these changing demographics exhibit one simple thing: 
Many more couples are going into marriage after obtaining higher 
                                                                                                             
 
half of all banking and insurance jobs. About a third of America’s 
physicians are now women, as are 45% of associates in law firms—and 
both those percentages are rising fast. 
Id. 
 18. Id. The numbers are truly staggering—women earn 60% of all bachelor’s 
and master’s degrees, approximately 50% of all law and medical degrees, and 
42% of all M.B.A.s. Id. Rosin additionally notes that of the 15 job categories 
projected to grow most in the next decade in the United States, women primarily 
occupy 13 of them. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Stephanie Hallet, Marriage Rate in America Drops Drastically, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 14, 2011, 2:09 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com 
/2011/12/14/marriage-rates-in-america_n_1147290.html [http://perma.cc/3MN7-
2RLT] (archived Mar. 8, 2014). 
 21. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE DECLINE OF MARRIAGE AND RISE OF NEW 
FAMILIES 11 (2010), available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/11 
/pew-social-trends-2010-families.pdf [http://perma.cc/XUS9-ESNN] (archived 
Mar. 8, 2014). In 1960, college graduates (76%) were only slightly more likely 
than those who never attended college (72%) to marry. Id. By 2008, that gap 
widened significantly. Only 48% of those with a high school diploma or less were 
married, compared with 64% of college graduates. Id. 
 22. Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, Marriage and Divorce: Changes and 
Their Driving Forces, 21 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 27 (2007). See also Jayson, 
supra note 8. 
 23. Jayson, supra note 8. For comparison, in 1980, the time of the last 
revision of community property laws, the median age of first marriage was 24.7 
for men and 22.0 for women. Median Age at First Marriage, PEARSON EDUC., 
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0005061.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) 
[http://perma.cc/D6LV-EJ2E] (archived Mar. 8, 2014). 
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educational degrees and, as a result, are marrying with increasing 
amounts of student loan debt.24  
This interconnection between marriage and student loan debt is 
particularly important because today’s society places a higher value 
on education than ever before.25 The cost of college tuition has 
increased by approximately 900% since 1978.26 As a result, many 
students are finding it necessary to pay for their higher education by 
taking out student loans. In fact, there are approximately 37 million 
student loan borrowers with debts totaling between $902 billion and 
$1 trillion.27 In 2011, 46% of Louisiana college seniors had student 
loan debt, which averaged $22,455.28 Student loan debt is now 
                                                                                                             
 24. See Brown et al., supra note 10. 
 25. Society’s current expectations regarding the education level required for 
even lower paying jobs means that being without a bachelor’s degree is essentially 
not an option. In many circumstances, even a bachelor’s degree is not considered 
to be a substantial accomplishment, and it certainly does not guarantee 
employment. See Greg Ip, The Declining Value of Your College Degree, WALL 
ST. J., http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121623686919059307.html (last updated 
July 17, 2008) [http://perma.cc/JP3K-55FA] (archived Mar. 8, 2014) (opining that 
a degree “isn’t any big guarantee of employment, it’s a basic requirement, a step 
you have to take to even be considered for many professional jobs”). Additionally, 
as of 2011, nearly 28% of Americans have a bachelor’s degree, compared to less 
than 5% in 1940. See Alex Richards, Census Date Shows Rise in College Degrees, 
but also in Racial Gaps in Education, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 23, 2011), 
http://chronicle.com/article/Census-Data-Reveal-Rise-in/126026/ [http://perma.cc 
/ZW5L-EXQ2] (archived Mar. 8, 2014). According to the U.S. Census Bureau, 
workers 18 and over possessing bachelor’s degrees earn an average of $67,140 per 
year, while those with a high school diploma earn a mere $35,170. BUREAU OF 
LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT PROJECTIONS 2012–
2022 tbl. 7 (2012), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ecopro.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/595U-8LK5] (archived Mar. 8, 2014). Workers with a 
professional degree top the chart making an average of $96,420 per year. Id. 
 26. Larry Doyle, Are Student Loans an Impending Bubble? Is Higher 
Education a Scam?, BENZINGA (Apr. 26, 2011, 9:00 AM), http://www.benzinga 
.com/11/04/1032314/are-student-loans-an-impending-bubble-is-higher-education-a-
scam [http://perma.cc/UU4S-FSNM] (archived Mar. 8, 2014) (opining that since 
1978, the price of tuition at U.S. colleges has increased over 900%, 650 points above 
inflation). Doyle put this number in perspective, noting that housing prices, the 
bubble that nearly burst the U.S. economy, increased only 50 points during those 
years. Id. 
 27. See Rohit Chopra, Too Big to Fail: Student Debt Hits a Trillion, 
CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/too 
-big-to-fail-student-debt-hits-a-trillion (last visited Sept. 23, 2012) [http://perma 
.cc/3ZY-YY8Q] (archived Mar. 8, 2014); see also Brown et al., supra note 10. 
 28. See Matthew Reed & Debbie Cochrane, The Project on Student Loan 
Debt, INST. FOR C. ACCESS & SUCCESS, http://projectonstudentdebt.org/state_by 
_state-data.php (last visited Feb. 6, 2013) [http://perma.cc/WN5D-SS7R] 
(archived Mar. 8, 2014). Additionally, on a national basis, 40% of U.S. households 
headed by someone 35 years old or younger have student loan debt. See Hope 
Yen, Student Loan Debt Stretches to New Record Number of Households: Pew 
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commonplace, and many individuals enter into marriage knowing 
that they or their future spouse will likely have student loan debt.29 
Couples marrying today differ greatly from the married couple 
envisaged by the revision of Louisiana’s matrimonial regimes law in 
1980. Compared to past couples, many of today’s couples are more 
socially and economically equal, enter marriage at an older age, are 
better educated, and are much more likely to enter into the marriage 
carrying substantial student loan debt. Unfortunately, however, 
Louisiana’s community property regime has yet to account for these 
changes. 
B. The Basic Tenants of Community Property Law in Louisiana 
The default legal regime governing marriage in Louisiana is a 
community of acquets and gains—commonly referred to as a 
“community property regime.”30 Under this regime, the property of 
a married couple is classified as either separate or community.31 
Generally, community property consists of property obtained during 
the marriage through the “effort, skill, or industry of either spouse” 
and also property obtained with community things or with a 
combination of community and separate things.32 Each spouse owns 
                                                                                                             
 
Research Analysis, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 27, 2012, 4:06 AM), http://www 
.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/26/student-loan-debt-households-record_n_1917681 
.html [http://perma.cc/F8AB-8RQV] (archived Mar. 8, 2014). On an individual 
basis, college seniors graduating in 2012 accumulated an average debt of $25,250. 
Id. 
 29. See Jennifer Ludden, Call Me Maybe When Your Student Loan Is Paid in 
Full, NPR (July 16, 2012, 4:09 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/07/16/156736915 
/call-me-maybe-when-your-school-loan-is-paid-in-full [http://perma.cc/PQE8-5N 
4J] (archived Mar. 8, 2014). 
 30. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2334 (2014) (“The legal regime of community of 
acquets and gains applies to spouses domiciled in this state, regardless of their 
domicile at the time of marriage or the place of celebration of the marriage.”). 
 31. See id. art. 2335 (“Property of married persons is either community or 
separate.”). 
 32. See id. art. 2338 (stating that additional classifications of community 
property include property donated to the spouses jointly, natural and civil fruits of 
community property, damages awarded for loss or injury to a thing belonging to 
the community, and all other property not classified by law as separate property); 
see generally Cameron v. Rowland, 40 So. 2d 1 (La. 1948) (finding that a bank 
account made up of deposits of rentals from realty belonging to the community of 
husband and wife was a community asset, though carried in wife’s name); 
McMichael v. McMichael, 205 So. 2d 433 (La. 1967) (finding that husband, who 
earned bonuses from his industry with his employer between time that wife 
instituted suit for separation in 1958 and entry of judgment of divorce in October 
1961, and whose bonuses formed part of his salary not considered in computation 
of alimony would be required to account to wife for amounts so received); Barr v. 
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an undivided one-half interest in all of the community property 
owned by the couple.33 Separate property consists of property 
belonging to a spouse prior to the commencement of a community 
property regime, as well as things acquired exclusively with separate 
assets or with a mixture of separate and community assets where the 
amount of the community investment is minimal.34 
The law surrounding the community property regime becomes 
particularly interesting as it relates to debt.35 As long as the 
community property regime continues (for the duration of the 
marriage), either spouse may use community funds to pay separate 
as well as community debts.36 As such, during the existence of the 
regime, there is no actual need to distinguish between separate and 
community debts.37 However, upon the termination of the 
community property regime, the classification of debts as 
community or separate can have significant consequences. One such 
consequence is the reimbursement claim.38 
                                                                                                             
 
Barr, 613 So. 2d 1159 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that evidence supported finding 
that watch was community property, despite former husband’s claim that watch 
was purchased mostly with separate property by exchanging former husband’s old 
jewelry plus smaller amount of cash that was community property); Houghton v. 
Hall, 148 So. 37 (La. 1933) (stating that confusion of separate and community 
funds in making up consideration for purchasing property makes property 
purchased community property). 
 33. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2336 (2014) (noting that Louisiana requires an 
equal division of property). 
 34. Robert Pascal, Louisiana’s 1978 Matrimonial Regimes Legislation, 53 
TUL. L. REV 105, 118 (1978). See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 2341 (2014); see 
generally Phillips v. Wagner, 470 So. 2d 262 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that 52 
shares of stock in realty company that were husband’s prior to his marriage were 
clearly his separate property); Bass v. Larche, 7 La. Ann. 104 (La. 1852) (stating 
that property bought by the husband during the community and paid for out of his 
own funds, under circumstances showing a clear intention to buy for his separate 
account, is exclusively his); Succession of Hemenway, 83 So. 2d 377 (La. 1955) 
(finding that stocks directly traceable to inheritance by decedent from his father’s 
estate were assets of decedent’s separate estate and not community property). 
 35. See Andrea Carroll, The Superior Position of the Creditor in the 
Community Property Regime: Has the Community Become a Mere Creditor 
Collection Device?, 47 SANTA CLARA L. REV 1 (2007) (noting that a great 
windfall comes to the creditor whose struggling debtor marries an employed 
person in a community property state and creditors’ rights are substantially 
expanded by the marriage alone). 
 36. Pascal, supra note 34, at 120. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 445, 1312 (8th ed. 2004) (defining 
“reimbursement” as “repayment and indemnification”); see also LA. CIV. CODE 
art. 2358 (2014) (“A spouse may have a claim against the other spouse for 
reimbursement in accordance with the following Articles. A claim for 
reimbursement may be asserted only after termination of the community property 
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The purpose of a reimbursement claim is to “ultimately [lessen] 
the economic burden imposed upon a spouse where he pays debts 
for which he should not be held solely responsible.”39 When 
community property is used to satisfy a separate obligation of one 
spouse, the other spouse is entitled to reimbursement for one-half of 
the amount used from his or her patrimony40 to satisfy the debt at 
the termination of the regime.41 A claim for reimbursement may be 
asserted only after termination of the community property regime.42 
Louisiana Civil Code article 2345 demonstrates that a separate 
obligation, such as a student loan debt acquired before marriage, 
may be satisfied during the marriage using community property.43 In 
Louisiana, because all earnings are considered to be community 
property, separate debts are almost always going to be paid using 
community funds because they are paid from the spouses’ salaries.44 
Thus, if one spouse takes out loans prior to the marriage and makes 
the subsequent payments with community funds, the non-debtor 
spouse can file a reimbursement claim seeking to recover one-half 
of that debt at the termination of the community property regime.45 
Ultimately, separate debts are not at issue until the termination 
of the community property regime.46 However, this issue is 
significant because approximately 41%47 of all marriages in the 
                                                                                                             
 
regime, unless otherwise provided by law.”); see also SPAHT & MORENO, supra 
note 13. 
 39. SPAHT & MORENO, supra note 13, at 561. 
 40. See A. N. YIANNOPULOUS, PROPERTY § 190, in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW 
TREATISE 351 (2001) (defining “patrimony” as “an economic unit consisting of 
the sum total of a person’s assets and liabilities”). 
 41. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2364 (2014). Additionally, the comments 
following article 2358.1 expound on the reasoning behind reimbursement claims: 
One-half of the community property that was used to satisfy the separate 
obligation of a spouse belonged to that spouse and, therefore, no 
reimbursement is due to him. The other half of the community property 
that was used belonged to the other spouse, and therefore, reimbursement 
is due to him. 
Id. art. 2364 cmt. c. 
 42. Id. art. 2358. 
 43. Id. art. 2345. 
 44. Earnings are generally considered to be community property. See 
generally Paxton v. Bramlette, 228 So. 2d 161 (La. Ct. App. 1970) (holding that a 
wife’s salary was community income). 
 45. Art. 2364. 
 46. Pascal, supra note 34, at 118. 
 47. Dan Hurley, Divorce Rate: It’s Not as High as You Think, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 19, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/19/health/19divo.html?_r=0 
[http://perma.cc/JA5L-KTGN] (archived Mar. 8, 2014). 
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United States end in divorce.48 As such, in light of a generation 
plagued with student loan debt, the laws regarding reimbursement 
claims must be revised.49 Under current Louisiana law, individuals 
seeking the American dream—higher education, a great job, and a 
loving spouse—may ultimately find themselves in a nightmare 
divorce under the confines of article 2364. 
II. THE ARTICLE 2364 DILEMMA: LOUISIANA’S CURRENT APPROACH 
At first glance, Louisiana Civil Code article 2364 seems 
innocent enough. It allows for recovery if one spouse uses some of 
his or her money to pay the other spouse’s debt.50 However, its 
application often leads to harsh results. The text of the article itself 
allows no room for consideration of equity or the circumstances of a 
particular case.51 It provides an unwavering condition—if there is a 
separate debt paid with community funds, then the non-debtor 
spouse is entitled to reimbursement.52 A survey of related articles 
and jurisprudence affirms that Louisiana’s current law provides no 
remedy for the unsuspecting debtor spouse who is left to pay more 
money for his or her student loan debt than ever imagined. 
A. Article 121: A Misleading Provision 
It is a common misconception that Louisiana Civil Code article 
121 provides a solution for the inequity in reimbursement claims for 
student loan debt.53 Article 121 reads as follows: 
                                                                                                             
 48. Of course, all marriages end (if not in divorce) at death. Reimbursement 
can also be sought at the death of the debtor spouse, though this is not the focus of 
this Comment. See art. 2364. 
 49. Mark Kantrowitz, Who Graduates College with Six-Figure Student Loan 
Debt?, FINAID, www.finaid.org/educators/20120801sixfiguredebt.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 27, 2012) [http://perma.cc/D8LA-B29V] (archived Mar. 8, 2014) (stressing 
that the overall number of students graduating with six-figure student loan debt is 
low). However, the study notes that that 36.2% of 2007–2008 law school 
graduates had six-figure debt. Id. The report also presented a startling rise in the 
numbers of borrowers with six-figure loan debt at both the graduate and 
undergraduate levels. Id. According to the report, in 1995–1996, the total number 
of graduate students with combined undergraduate and graduate debt in six figures 
was only 3,300. Id. By 1999–2000, it was 21,200. By 2003–2004, it was 51,100, 
and by 2007–2008, it was 70,800. Id. Undergraduates display what may be a 
similar trend. Id. In 1999–2000, there were no undergraduates with six-figure debt. 
By 2003–2004, there were 2,400, and by 2007–2008, there were 7,800. Id. 
 50. Art. 2364. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. art. 121. 
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In a proceeding for divorce or thereafter, the court may 
award a party a sum for his financial contributions made 
during the marriage to education or training of his spouse 
that increased the spouse’s earning power, to the extent that 
the claimant did not benefit during the marriage from the 
increased earning power. The sum awarded may be in 
addition to a sum for support and to property received in the 
partition of community property.54 
It would seem that an award for one spouse’s contribution to 
the other’s education limited “to the extent that the claimant did 
not benefit during the marriage from the increased earning power” 
would solve the inequity found in article 2364.55 However, an 
understanding of the legislative intent underlying article 121 shows 
that it is outdated.56 The Legislature enacted this provision to deal 
with “the usual situation that has prompted the making of awards 
of this kind,” involving a wife who “supported her husband 
through professional school, only to be divorced by him shortly 
after his graduation.”57 The problem that the Legislature sought to 
remedy is no longer a pervasive issue, as men and women stand on 
much more equal ground economically.58 
Further, article 121 is much too vague to solve the inequity 
found in article 2364. The provision does not address the issue of 
student loans explicitly, leaving the current state of the law in 
essentially the same position of uncertainty provided by article 
2364. It does not distinguish separate debts from community debts 
                                                                                                             
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. cmt. c. 
 57. Id. The comments continue to explain the reasoning behind such awards: 
Usually the wife has had little opportunity to share in the husband’s 
enhanced income, and ordinarily little or no community property has 
accumulated to be divided between them. Thus, the only way to 
compensate her is by means of a monetary award akin to support, but 
different from support in that it is not affected by the various factors that 
govern such an award. 
Id. 
 58. See discussion supra Part I.A; see also Dionissi Aliprantis et al., The 
Growing Difference in College Attainment Between Women and Men, FEDERAL 
RES. BANK CLEVELAND, http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/commentary/2011 
/2011-21.cfm (last visited Sept. 30, 2012) [http://perma.cc/B28C-82E9] (archived 
Mar. 8, 2014). Aliprantis observes that women have higher educational attainment 
rates across all three higher-education categories—associate’s, bachelor’s, and 
graduate degrees. Id. Approximately 28% of women ages 24–25 years old have 
attained a bachelor’s degree, while only 21% of their male counterparts have done 
so. Id. Likewise, approximately 4% of females ages 24–25 have acquired a 
professional degree, compared with only 2–3% of their male counterparts. Id. 
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or address which spouse is responsible for them. Additionally, the 
wording of the article demonstrates that an award under article 121 
is discretionary.59 The injustice found in reimbursement claims for 
student loan debt requires a more explicit limitation.60 
Nevertheless, cases decided under article 121 are useful in 
analyzing whether a reimbursement claim for student loan debt 
should be permitted. Hunter v. Hunter involved a couple married for 
18 years, during which time Mrs. Hunter sought a nursing degree.61 
Mr. Hunter paid all of his wife’s educational expenses, except for 
tuition, which was paid using student loans.62 Following their 
divorce, Mr. Hunter sought reimbursement for the educational 
expenses that he paid on behalf of his wife during the time that she 
was attending school.63 
The Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal ultimately found 
that Mr. Hunter could not recover the money paid toward his wife’s 
degree because he benefited from her increased income during the 
marriage “by an improved standard of living and an accumulation of 
community property.”64 Further, Mrs. Hunter’s student loan debt, 
accounting for more than half of the educational expense, was paid 
within two years after she began working.65 Essentially, Mr. Hunter 
received no reimbursement for his contributions to her education 
because the court found that he benefited from her education and 
thus indirectly from her debt.66 Injecting the Hunter court’s analysis 
into article 2364 would provide for equitable results in situations 
where the debt is acquired prior to the marriage but the spouse 
similarly benefited from it during the marriage. Unfortunately, the 
jurisprudence demonstrates that courts have not made such equitable 
considerations in cases dealing with reimbursement claims for 
student loan debt, even when the spouse has benefited from the 
result of the debt during the marriage. 
                                                                                                             
 59. Art. 121. 
 60. See discussion infra Part III.  
 61. 813 So. 2d 1106, 1107 (La. Ct. App. 2002). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 1108. 
 64. Id. at 1109. The court noted that Mrs. Hunter earned approximately 
$80,000 during the period between her graduation and the parties’ physical 
separation and that all of her earnings were deposited into the parties’ joint 
account. Id. Further, in determining Mr. Hunter’s benefit, the court considered 
several factors, including “whether the claimant expected a shared benefit when 
the contribution was made, the degree of detriment suffered by the claimant in 
making the contribution, and the magnitude of the benefit received by the other 
spouse.” Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See id. 
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B. Jurisprudence Involving Reimbursement Claims Generally 
Louisiana courts have been willing to consider whether the non-
debtor spouse benefited from a debt acquired prior to marriage when 
dealing with other types of debt.67 In Parker v. Parker, the court 
considered whether a non-debtor spouse had a reimbursement claim 
for interest on a mortgage debt.68 The Parkers were married for 
approximately four years.69 Prior to the marriage, Mrs. Parker 
acquired a townhouse, which was used as the family home.70 The 
Parkers made 31 mortgage payments on the debt during the 
marriage.71 After the termination of the marriage, the parties agreed 
that Mr. Parker was entitled to reimbursement for one-half of the 
community funds used to reduce the principal portion of this debt.72 
However, Mr. Parker asserted that he was further entitled to 
reimbursement for half of the community funds used to pay the 
interest.73 
The court ultimately concluded that the use of Mrs. Parker’s 
separate residence by the community was an enjoyment of the 
“natural and civil fruits”74 of the separate property.75 Thus, payment 
of the interest benefited the community because it was a cost of 
maintaining the natural and civil fruits of this separate property for 
the community’s use.76 Therefore, the court concluded that the 
interest cost should not be included in the amount to which the other 
                                                                                                             
 67. Sims v. Sims, 677 So. 2d 663, 667 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (finding that 
husband was not entitled to reimbursement for half of the community funds paid 
to interest on mortgage where the wife’s separate property had benefited the 
community by serving as the family home). See also Hurta v. Hurta 260 So. 2d 
324, 327 (La. Ct. App. 1972) (finding that “[b]y providing his separate house as 
the family home, the husband dedicates its actual ‘profits’ . . . to the community, 
and that dedication produces an actual, in-pocket, dollar saving to the community 
in the form of the rent for another house which the community consequently does 
not have to expend”); see generally Willis v. Willis, 454 So. 2d 429, 431 (La. Ct. 
App. 1984) (finding that the interest cost on a husband’s separate mortgage should 
not have been included in the amount to which his wife was entitled to 
reimbursement). 
 68. 517 So. 2d 264, 265 (La. Ct. App. 1987). 
 69. Id. at 264. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. LA. CIV. CODE art. 551 (2014) (“Fruits are things that are produced by or 
derived from another thing without diminution of its substance. . . . [N]atural fruits 
are products of the earth or of animals. Civil fruits are revenues derived from a 
thing by operation of law or by reason of a juridical act, such as rentals, interest, 
and certain corporate distributions.”). 
 75. Parker, 517 So. 2d at 265. 
 76. Id. 
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spouse is entitled for reimbursement.77 Oddly enough, though the 
benefit enjoyed by a non-debtor spouse as a result of the debtor 
spouse’s student loan debt is analogous to the benefit found in cases 
involving mortgages, Louisiana courts have been unwilling to 
extend this reasoning to claims for student loan debt. 
C. Jurisprudence Involving Reimbursement Claims for Student Loan 
Debt 
Although there is a substantial amount of jurisprudence 
regarding reimbursement claims for student loan debt in Louisiana, 
there are very few cases dealing specifically with student loan debt 
acquired prior to marriage. This distinction is important because 
student loan debt acquired during marriage, which is considered a 
community obligation, is ineligible for a reimbursement claim.78 An 
analysis of those cases, coupled with an understanding of the courts’ 
reasonings in cases dealing with student loan debts acquired during 
the marriage, demonstrates Louisiana’s desperate need to amend the 
current law to reflect societal expectations. 
In Katner v. Katner, a couple brought various reimbursement 
claims against each other after the termination of their ten-year 
marriage.79 One of these claims involved Mr. Katner’s assertion that 
he was entitled to reimbursement for half of the amount paid toward 
Mrs. Katner’s separate debt.80 Prior to the marriage, Mrs. Katner had 
taken out student loans to fund her legal education,81 and during the 
marriage, the couple used community funds to satisfy the debt.82 
In resolving the case, the appellate court applied a strict and 
literal interpretation of article 2364.83 It found that the trial court 
correctly determined that community funds were used to satisfy 
Mrs. Katner’s separate debt, and Mr. Katner was entitled to 
reimbursement valued at half the amount of the community funds 
used to pay the debt.84 
                                                                                                             
 77. Id. 
 78. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2360 (2014) (“An obligation incurred by a spouse 
during the existence of a community property regime for the common interest of 
the spouses or for the interest of the other spouse is a community obligation.”). 
 79. 28 So. 3d 566, 569 (La. Ct. App. 2009). See also art. 551. Because the 
spouses did not exclude the community property regime under article 2339, the 
regime was established pursuant to article 2334. 
 80. Katner, 28 So. 3d at 575. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 576. 
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This holding perfectly exemplifies Louisiana’s current approach 
to student loan debt acquired prior to marriage. The court applied 
the literal text of article 2364 without considering the circumstances 
of the particular case.85 The court failed to consider the length of the 
marriage, the financial contributions that Mrs. Katner made to the 
marriage, or the benefits that her profession provided.86 All of these 
factors were directly related to the student loan debt she acquired to 
pursue her legal degree, and declining to consider those factors led 
to an inequitable result. Mr. Katner enjoyed the fruits of Mrs. 
Katner’s legal education for almost a decade, yet he was still able to 
recover a significant amount of money.87 The benefits that Mr. 
Katner received from Mrs. Katner’s higher earning capacity were 
still not enough to preclude him from recovery.88 Most people do 
not expect such a result after allowing their spouse to benefit from 
their higher earning capacity for the duration of the marriage.89 
Aside from Katner, the other relevant cases involve debts 
acquired during the marriage.90 This is particularly significant 
because current statistics regarding the average amount of student 
loan debt and the age of first marriage suggest that today’s betrothed 
couples expect their future spouses to enter the marriage with 
student loan debts.91 Current law simply does not reflect that reality. 
Nevertheless, in McConathy v. McConathy, the Louisiana 
Second Circuit Court of Appeal shed some light on considerations 
that may be helpful in determining whether a reimbursement claim 
for student loan debt is appropriate.92 The case involved a couple 
seeking to partition their community property as part of their divorce 
                                                                                                             
 85. Id. at 579. 
 86. Id. at 575.  
 87. Id. at 569, 575. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, § 4.12 cmt. a (2002). The American Law 
Institute asserts that “[a]fter many years of marriage, spouses typically do not 
think of their separate-property assets as separate, even if they would be so 
classified under the technical property rules.” Id.; When You Say ‘I Do,’ Who Pays 
the Debt?, BUDGETS ARE SEXY (July 15, 2012), http://www.budgetsaresexy 
.com/2012/07/married-debt-who-pays [http://perma.cc/FY8-J6MS] (archived Mar. 
8, 2014) (noting that in asking a handful of married and non-married persons about 
debt obtained prior to marriage, “[a]ll of the people [she] asked stated they believe 
once married, all debts prior to marriage should be paid by the couple and is no 
longer just the responsibility of the individual debtor. It was no longer ‘his debt’ or 
‘her debt’ but ‘our debt.’”). 
 90. See McConathy v. McConathy, 632 So. 2d 1200, 1202 (La. Ct. App. 
1994); see also Munson v. Munson, 772 So. 2d 141, 145 (La. Ct. App. 2000). 
 91. See discussion supra Part I.A. 
 92. McConathy, 632 So. 2d at 1200. 
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proceedings.93 Mr. and Mrs. McConathy94 married in 1976, and 
shortly thereafter, Mrs. McConathy suggested that Mr. McConathy 
return to school to pursue a degree in elementary education.95 While 
Mr. McConathy attended school, Mrs. McConathy worked full time 
and was the primary source of support for the family.96 The couple 
ultimately separated in May of 1988, and Mr. McConathy received 
his degree later that year.97 
After receiving a judgment of divorce, Mrs. McConathy sought 
to partition the community property and subsequently requested 
reimbursement for her contributions to her husband’s education, 
including both living expenses and payments toward his student 
loan debt.98 The trial court granted Mrs. McConathy an award for 
her contribution to her husband’s education under article 121 but 
found that his student loans comprised a community debt and 
therefore denied her request for reimbursement.99 
On appeal, Mrs. McConathy argued that the trial court erred in 
classifying her husband’s student loan debt as a community debt.100 
In resolving the issue of the student debt, the appellate court 
determined that the debt was a community obligation.101 The court 
concluded that, at the time that the student loans were obtained, Mr. 
and Mrs. McConathy contemplated that Mr. McConathy’s “pursuit 
of a higher education would ultimately benefit the community by 
increasing his earning capacity. . . [and t]herefore . . . the funds were 
obtained for the ‘common interests of the spouses.’”102 
Likewise, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal in 
Munson v. Munson echoed the ruling of McConathy, finding that 
student loans obtained by Mrs. Munson during her ten-year marriage 
were acquired in hopes that they would benefit the Munson 
                                                                                                             
 93. Id. at 1202. 
 94. The case, though named McConathy v. McConathy, consistently refers to 
the wife as Ms. Prestridge suggesting that, after the divorce, she chose to revert 
back to using her maiden name. For clarity purposes, the author will refer to her as 
Mrs. McConathy. 
 95. McConathy, 632 So. 2d at 1202. 
 96. Id. See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 121 (2014). 
 97. McConathy, 632 So. 2d at 1202. 
 98. Id. Mrs. McConathy requested reimbursement under article 121, which is 
discussed infra Part III.B. Though she did not seek to recover under article 2364 
(as it did not go into effect until 1980), the court’s reasoning is still relevant to the 
current analysis. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2360 (2014) (defining a community obligation 
as “[a]n obligation incurred by a spouse during the existence of a community 
property regime for the common interest of the spouses or for the interest of the 
other spouse is a community obligation”). 
 102. McConathy, 632 So. 2d at 1207. 
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family.103 The facts in Munson are essentially the same as in 
McConathy: Mrs. Munson acquired two student loans during her 
marriage, and community funds were used to satisfy the 
obligation.104 The Munson court cited McConathy, finding that the 
Munsons “anticipated that the 1991 and 1992 student loans would 
ultimately improve Mrs. Munson’s earning power for the 
community’s benefit.”105 
Although McConathy and Munson involve student loan debt 
obtained during the marriage, the same reasoning from these cases 
logically applies to debt obtained prior to the marriage.106 In fact, 
both courts’ rulings precisely advocate that the same reasoning 
apply to debt obtained prior to the marriage.107 The McConathy 
court noted that to determine whether the funds used to pay the 
student loan debt were beneficial to the community, an examination 
must be made as to the uses to which it was put.108 The court 
decided that because Mr. McConathy obtained the loans in hopes of 
ultimately being a better provider for his family, the loans were 
acquired for the common interests of the spouses.109 The 
classification of the debt as a community obligation is particularly 
interesting in light of the fact that Mr. McConathy did not even 
obtain his degree until after the separation.110 Mrs. McConathy did 
not even have the chance to benefit from the debt, yet the court 
found that it was a community obligation merely because it was 
intended to benefit the family.111 The Munson court iterated similar 
concerns.112 As such, it seems that both courts stretched the 
definition of a community obligation, classifying the student loan 
debt in a manner likely to preserve an equitable result while staying 
within the limited action allowed by the Civil Code.113 These results 
suggest that, though the courts in Munson and McConathy could 
                                                                                                             
 103. Munson v. Munson, 772 So. 2d 141, 145 (La. Ct. App. 2000). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See McConathy, 632 So. 2d at 1202; see also Munson, 772 So. 2d at 145. 
 107. See McConathy, 632 So. 2d at 1202; see also Munson, 772 So. 2d at 145. 
 108. McConathy, 632 So. 2d at 1206. 
 109. Id. at 1207. 
 110. Id. at 1202. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Munson, 772 So. 2d at 145. The Munson court cited McConathy and 
agreed that, in order to determine whether the debt benefited the community, the 
court must examine the uses to which it was put. Id. Ultimately, the Munson court 
characterized the student loans as community property and found that the 
Munsons “anticipated that the . . . student loans would ultimately improve Mrs. 
Munson’s earning power for the community’s benefit.” Id. 
 113. McConathy, 632 So. 2d at 1207. See also Munson, 772 So. 2d at 145; LA. 
CIV. CODE art. 2364 (2014). 
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have classified the student loan debt as separate, they did not do so 
to avoid allowing the claimant–spouses to obtain reimbursement. 
The facts in Katner, dealing with a student loan debt acquired 
before marriage, parallel those of McConathy and Munson, with the 
exception of the time when the loan was obtained.114 As the law 
currently stands, the timing of the debt changes everything. Because 
regardless of the temporal element, couples anticipate benefiting 
from the opportunities allowed by the student loan debt, there is no 
logical reason to make different considerations when dealing with 
student loan debt acquired prior to the marriage and student loan 
debt acquired during the marriage. The Legislature’s fascination 
with the temporal connection between the student loan debt and the 
marriage does not reflect the societal expectations exhibited by 
current developments in marriage and education.115 As such, a sharp 
distinction must be drawn between student loan debt and other kinds 
of debt.  
III. STUDENT LOAN DEBT AS THE EXCEPTION: A PUBLIC POLICY 
ANALYSIS 
Above all else, the law should reflect what reasonable people 
would realistically expect it to be.116 Society evolves, and 
consequently, some laws must be periodically reconsidered to 
accommodate societal change. Today’s married couples would not 
realistically expect to be blindsided by a reimbursement claim for 
money contributed toward a student loan debt that both agreed 
would be beneficial to their life together.117 This peculiarity suggests 
that student loan debt is not like other types of debt and needs 
directed regulation. Additionally, as a matter of public policy, 
people would not envision that the law allows an unjust double, or 
even triple, recovery, particularly in light of an event as traumatic as 
                                                                                                             
 114. Katner v. Katner, 28 So. 3d 566, 575 (La. Ct. App. 2009). 
 115. See discussion supra Part I. 
 116. Elizabeth Cook, Laws Should Reflect ‘Reality of Modern Society’, 
POLITICSHOME (Nov. 9, 2009), http://centrallobby.politicshome.com/latestnews 
/article-detail/newsarticle/laws-should-reflect-reality-of-modern-society/ [http://per 
ma.cc/5RN2-7UDK] (archived Mar. 8, 2014) (noting that it is “vital that the legal 
rules remain relevant and up-to-date, reflecting the reality of modern society and the 
reasonable expectations of those who have been bereaved”); Law Reforms Should 
Reflect Changes in Society, HINDU (Feb. 5, 2011), http://www.thehindu.com  
/news/cities/Hyderabad/law-reforms-should-reflect-changes-in-society/article11  
56903.ece [http://perma.cc/Z4GL-MHQU] (archived Mar. 8, 2014) (opining that  
“reforms in law should be in tune with the changing socio-economic conditions of 
society”). 
 117. AM. LAW INST., supra note 89; When You Say ‘I Do,’ Who Pays the 
Debt?, supra note 89. 
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divorce.118 Louisiana’s current law does not comprehend these 
realities and must be revised to limit reimbursement claims for 
student loan debt. 
A. Student Loan Debt Does Not Fit Into the Mold of Other Debt 
This Comment does not suggest that Louisiana law should 
exempt all debt from the possibility of a reimbursement claim. In 
fact, with most kinds of debt, providing the opportunity to file a 
reimbursement claim is completely equitable. For example, consider 
a situation in which one spouse purchases a home prior to the 
commencement of marriage and portions of the other spouse’s 
wages are used to pay off the mortgage on that house. After divorce, 
the non-debtor spouse no longer receives any benefit from 
contributing to the purchase of that home. In this scenario, a 
reimbursement claim is an equitable remedy. However, the 
characteristics that make a reimbursement claim equitable under 
these and similar circumstances are not reflected in student loan 
debt. 
Student loan debt is different from other types of debt because 
most states, including Louisiana, do not recognize educational 
degrees as property, asserting that a degree does not have “the 
characteristics of ‘property’ as defined in a legal context.”119 
Rather, courts consider a degree to be merely “a formal recognition 
of an individual’s competency and skill.”120 Moreover, most courts 
do not view educational degrees as property because of the inherent 
difficulty found in calculating the value of a degree.121 This 
classification has particular significance in a community property 
state because if treated as property, a degree would likely be 
considered to be community property and would thus be subject to a 
division of its value at the termination of the community property 
regime. 122 
Valuing a degree would require contemplation of factors such as 
which university the individual attended, how well he or she 
performed in school, what the current job market is in his or her 
particular field and locale, and how he or she used the degree. As 
such, Louisiana has remained steadfast in its refusal to recognize a 
degree as property, and its reasoning for this choice provides a 
                                                                                                             
 118. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 119. Gessner v. Gessner, 614 So. 2d 307, 309 (La. Ct. App. 1993). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. (noting that the definition of property in Louisiana “cannot be so 
extended and distorted to include within that definition a professional degree and 
license”). See also Franklin v. Franklin, 155 P.2d 637, 641 (Cal. Ct. App. 1945). 
 122. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2336 (2014). 
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sound basis for simultaneously distinguishing student loan debt from 
other types of debt as they pertain to reimbursement claims.123 
Louisiana courts do not consider degrees as property because doing 
so would lead to confusing, inconsistent, and likely unfair results.124 
In the same vein, allowing reimbursement for one-half of the funds 
paid to satisfy student loan debt in the wake of the divorce may lead 
to perplexing and inequitable outcomes. 
B. The Law Should Not Encourage Inequitable Recovery 
Though student loan debt does not fit into the mold of other 
debts susceptible to reimbursement claims under article 2364, there 
is another, more important reason that student loan debt should be 
exempt from reimbursement claims: The law should not encourage 
inequitable recovery.125 
Traditionally, the civil law views equity strictly as a means to fill 
gaps in the Code when the law is silent on an issue.126 Louisiana 
Civil Code article 21 originally read as follows: 
In all civil matters, where there is no express law, the judge 
is bound to proceed and decide according to equity. To 
decide equitably, an appeal is to be made to natural law and 
reason, or received usages, where positive law is silent.127 
                                                                                                             
 123. Gessner, 614 So. 2d at 309. 
 124. For example, in some instances one might attend a prestigious school, yet 
never use his or her degree for what it was intended. In other cases, one might 
graduate from an unranked two-year college, yet might use the degree he or she 
obtained to its highest capacity. It would be difficult to reconcile these cases to 
achieve equitable results. 
 125. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2055 (2014) (defining “equity” as the principle 
that “no one is allowed to take unfair advantage of another and that no one is 
allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another”); see also Kennard v. 
Kennard, 747 So. 2d 628, 632 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (noting that the trial court’s 
decision to allow a reimbursement claim because “[o]nce [the trial court] stated 
that issue of reimbursement for educational contribution to wife had been 
stipulated to be $13,000 and ‘taken care of’ in community property partition, the 
court could not award [husband] an additional $13,000 as reimbursement for 
educational contributions . . . . To do so would thwart efforts between the parties 
to settle their community disputes, and . . . it would give [husband] the benefit of 
an unlawful double recovery.”). 
 126. LA. CIV. CODE art. 4 (2014). 
 127. LA. CIV. CODE art. 21 (1870) (emphasis added). See generally Mitchell 
Franklin, Equity in Louisiana: The Role of Article 21, 9 TUL. L. REV. 485 (1935). 
Though the substance of article 21 now resides in article 4 and no longer maintains 
the precise wording of the previous article, the revision comments make it clear 
that the revision did not change the law. 
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Thus, the Civil Code is meant to be equitable on its face, 
allowing the judge discretion only when the Code explicitly grants it 
or when the law is silent on an issue.128 Because the Code 
essentially allows judicial discretion as a final resort, it is important 
to ensure that the default law reflects such equity. Unfortunately, the 
law governing reimbursement claims is not equitable on its face, and 
thus it would be prudent for Louisiana to follow in the footsteps of 
other community property states in drafting specific legislation to 
expressly include equity in the method that courts use to award 
reimbursement claims for student loan debt.129 
Reimbursement claims for student loan debt are inequitable in 
their own right because they allow the non-debtor spouse to enjoy 
both the benefit of the opportunities allowed by the debt and 
recovery of half the amount contributed to it. However, this inequity 
is severely compounded when considered alongside the additional 
claims that the non-debtor spouse may have that are likewise 
associated with the debtor spouse’s attempt to obtain higher 
education. 
The first additional claim that the non-debtor spouse may have 
against the debtor spouse is for spousal support.130 There are two 
kinds of spousal support in Louisiana: interim periodic support and 
final periodic support.131 Though neither is guaranteed, Louisiana 
Civil Code article 116 suggests that interim spousal support cannot 
be waived. Both types of spousal support involve a consideration of 
the spouse’s ability to pay, which is directly correlative to the higher 
earning capacity received in large part because of the education paid 
                                                                                                             
 128. Art. 4. 
 129. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 130. LA. CIV. CODE art. 111 (2014). 
 131. See id. In Louisiana, spousal support is granted “in proportion to the 
wants of the person requiring it, and the circumstances of those who are to pay it.” 
Id. art. 231. Additionally, though neither is guaranteed, interim spousal support 
cannot be waived. See id. art. 116 (“The obligation of final spousal support may 
be modified, waived, or extinguished by judgment of a court of competent 
jurisdiction or by authentic act or act under private signature duly acknowledged 
by the obligee.”). There is no similar article allowing for a waiver of interim 
spousal support. The generally accepted notion is that, unlike interim support, final 
support is not a matter of public order about which couples are forbidden to 
contract under article 7. See generally McAlpine v. McAlpine, 679 So. 2d 85 (La. 
1996); see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 113 (2014) (noting that interim support 
terminates upon the rendition of a judgment awarding or denying final spousal 
support, though it can continue for an additional period of 180 days after a 
judgment of divorce and even longer with good cause). In determining whether 
interim spousal support is appropriate, the court considers the needs of the 
claimant, the ability of the other spouse to pay, and the standard of living that the 
couple enjoyed for the duration of their marriage. Id. 
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for by the student loan.132 Further, some courts have been quite 
liberal with their awards of spousal support in the past, taking into 
account the spouse’s potential earning capacity when considering 
the limit on the award.133 This fact is particularly relevant to the 
issue of student loan debt because pursuing higher education 
increases an individual’s earning power, though conceivably he or 
she may not decide to pursue that power to its full capacity.134 
Perhaps a spouse attends law school but decides that his or her 
talents are better suited for public interest work than for being a 
litigator in a high-powered firm. His or her salary is a far cry from 
the potential earning capacity resulting from working for a large 
firm.135 The court could consider that unfulfilled earning potential in 
awarding spousal support.136 The inequity in these circumstances 
lies in the fact that current law essentially allows non-debtor spouses 
the opportunity to have their cake and eat it too. The non-debtor 
spouse is repaid for his or her contribution to a separate obligation 
that aided in funding the lifestyle to which the couple became 
accustomed during the marriage, but he or she is also awarded 
spousal support based on the debtor spouse’s income, which is 
                                                                                                             
 132. Art. 113 (noting that “the court may award a party an interim spousal 
support allowance based on the needs of that party, the ability of the other party to 
pay, and the standard of living of the parties during the marriage”). 
 133. See Moore v. Moore, 866 So. 2d 910, 917 (La. Ct. App. 2004). The 
Moore court’s reasoning was as follows: 
Christopher has a significant earning capacity. In addition to his 
experience as a financial planner, he now has worldwide certification as a 
soccer coach. Christopher makes the assertion that the $700.00 per month 
award exceeds one-third of his net income. We find the record unclear as 
to Christopher’s exact net income. There was enough testimony to 
establish that Christopher receives $1,700.00 per monthly salary plus an 
additional $300.00 per week for playing soccer and that he has 
substantially larger earning capacity. We, therefore, affirm the $700.00 
award of spousal support. 
Id.; see also Roan v. Roan, 870 So. 2d 626, 635 (La. Ct. App. 2004). In Roan v. 
Roan, Mr. Roan, a 70-year-old man, sought to lower the alimony payments to his 
ex-wife after he retired, arguing that his income was substantially less. Id. The 
court agreed with the trial court’s finding that “although Mr. Roan was 70 years 
old at the time of judgment, he was a vigorous man capable of continuing to 
work” and affirmed the original spousal support amount. Id. 
 134. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 25. 
 135. See Lisa Faye Petak, Young Lawyers Turn to Public Service, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 20, 2010, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/20 
/us/20defer.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/84P3-HCGU] (archived Mar. 8, 2014) 
(noting that the pay gap between public interest and private firm work is “steep”: 
Public interest attorneys generally start at, on average, $35,000 to $39,000 a year 
versus $140,000 to $150,000 with a large firm). 
 136. Moore, 866 So. 2d at 917. 
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statistically higher than it would have been without the student 
loans.137 
Unfortunately, the debtor spouse’s troubles may not end with the 
combination of spousal support and reimbursement claims. Suppose 
that one spouse takes out a student loan sufficient to cover the cost 
of tuition and textbooks but additionally relies on the non-debtor 
spouse to provide basic living expenses while the debtor spouse is 
attending school. Depending on the circumstances, the non-debtor 
spouse may also have a second, additional claim against the debtor 
spouse under article 121, although awards under this provision are 
limited to the extent that the spouse did not benefit during the 
marriage from the increased earning power.138 Thus, if the couple 
has not been married long enough for the non-debtor spouse to 
enjoy the fruits of the debtor spouse’s labor, the non-debtor spouse 
can also recover any contribution that he or she made to the debtor 
spouse’s education.139 The non-debtor spouse in such a situation 
could theoretically demand reimbursement for payments toward the 
student loan debts, reimbursement for his or her financial 
contribution to the couple’s living expenses, and spousal support.140 
Ultimately, a reimbursement claim for funds contributed to 
student loan debt obtained prior to the marriage allows inequitable 
recovery on its own. However, that injustice is magnified when 
considered alongside the additional claims that a spouse could 
potentially file.141 Under the current law, Louisiana is promoting a 
system that allows bitter spouses to recover not once, but possibly 
three times in a situation where the spouse has already benefited 
greatly from the opportunities made possible by the debt. 
                                                                                                             
 137. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, workers 18 and over possessing 
bachelor’s degrees earn an average of $54,756 per year, while those with a high 
school diploma earn a mere $33,176. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra 
note 25. Workers with a professional degree top the chart making an average of 
$86,580 per year. Id. 
 138. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 139. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 121 (2014). 
 140. Id. cmt. d (“‘Financial contributions’ include direct educational or training 
expenses paid by the claimant for the other spouse—such as tuition, books, and 
school fees. The term also includes financial contributions made to satisfy the 
living expenses of the supported spouse.”). See generally DeLa Rosa v. DeLa 
Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981); Reiss v. Reiss, 478 A.2d 441 (N.J. Ch. 
1984). 
 141. As previously mentioned, the spouse could have a claim for spousal 
support under article 111 or a claim for contribution under article 121. 
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C. The Law Should Reflect Reasonable Societal Expectations 
The most compelling reason for limiting reimbursement claims 
for student loan debt is a simple matter of public policy. In taking 
out loans and getting married, most people are likely not aware that 
they could be responsible for a significantly larger amount of money 
than they borrowed.142 As previously mentioned, couples today 
stand on quite different ground than they did 40 years ago.143 Those 
differences are mirrored in the process of courtship. Today, two-
thirds of couples live together before marriage.144 Living with an 
individual gives exposure to his or her financial responsibilities, and 
even if a couple doesn’t cohabitate, couples likely discuss finances 
before committing to marriage.145 Thus, it is not likely that student 
loan debt comes as a surprise to prospective newlyweds. 
However, it is likely that many people would be shocked to 
learn that their spouse could reclaim half of the community money 
paid toward their student loan debt, particularly when this debt 
ultimately contributed to the couple’s standard of living and quality 
of life.146 Most people would probably assume that contributing 
community funds to student loan debt is more like contributing 
community funds to pay a utility bill—both spouses share the 
benefit of what is obtained, and thus they must share the debt. In the 
case of student loans, both spouses share the benefit that the higher 
education provides. If both spouses agree to share these benefits, 
they likely also agree to share the expenses that are necessary to 
enjoy them. Such an expectation is entirely reasonable, yet 
Louisiana’s current law does not embody that notion. Instead, it 
                                                                                                             
 142. This is particularly true for individuals who do not have access to a legal 
education or the advice of an attorney. 
 143. See discussion supra Part I.A. 
 144. Leslie Mann, Cohabiting Happily Ever After, CHI. TRIBUNE (May 9, 2012), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-05-09/news/ct-x-living-together-201205  
09_1_cohabiting-premarital-education-couples [http://perma.cc/GVS2-CBWT]  
(archived Mar. 8, 2014). See also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE UC-1. UNMARRIED 
COUPLES OF THE OPPOSITE SEX, BY PRESENCE OF CHILDREN: 1960 TO PRESENT 
(2014), available at https://www.census.gov/hhes/families/files/uc1.xls [http://perma 
.cc/SGG7-8T6L] (archived Mar. 8, 2014). In 1960, approximately 439,000 
American couples cohabitated before marriage. Id. In 2000, that number increased to 
4.9 million. Id. Today, approximately 8 million people choose to cohabitate before 
marriage. Id. 
 145. Ludden, supra note 29. 
 146. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 89, § 4.12 cmt. a. The American Law 
Institute asserts that “[a]fter many years of marriage, spouses typically do not 
think of their separate-property assets as separate, even if they would be so 
classified under the technical property rules.” Id. 
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provides a means for angry spouses to demand recovery, allowing 
them to have their cake and eat it too. 
IV. NON-DEBTOR SPOUSES CANNOT HAVE THEIR CAKE AND EAT IT 
TOO 
The current law surrounding reimbursement claims for student 
loan debt is ripe for revision. Of course, a couple can compose a 
prenuptial agreement waiving the right to reimbursement; however, 
spouses who do not have the benefit of a legal education or the 
advice of counsel would likely not be aware of the consequences of 
not having a prenuptial agreement.147 Further, even if a couple is 
aware and understands the consequences, they still might decline to 
draft a prenuptial agreement because of the emotional and trust 
issues that are attached to such agreements.148 In fact, very few 
married or engaged individuals have a prenuptial agreement, 
demonstrating that this is probably not a realistic solution to the 
student loan debt problem in Louisiana.149 
There are two possible ways to solve the inequity that results 
from allowing reimbursement claims for student loan debt. The first 
solution is a judicial one—one in which the court applies the 
reasoning used by the court in Parker, which dealt with payments 
made during the marriage on a home acquired prior to the 
marriage.150 The second and best solution is to draft additional 
legislation to preempt the problem altogether by substantially 
limiting the extent to which the non-debtor spouse is awarded 
reimbursement for student loan debt payments. This approach may 
be achieved by looking to laws implemented in other community 
property states for guidance. 
                                                                                                             
 147. Though there is a presumption that things acquired during the marriage 
are community, couples can contract out of the community property regime. See 
LA. CIV. CODE art. 2340 (2014). 
 148. Carlin Flora, Let’s Make a Deal, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (Nov. 1, 2004), 
http://www.psychologytoday.com/articles/200411/lets-make-deal [http://perma.cc 
/9UW9-TL7C] (archived Mar. 8, 2014). 
 149. See Laura Petrecca, Prenuptial Agreements: Unromantic, but Important, 
USA TODAY, http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/basics/2010-03-08-prenups 
08_CV_N.htm (last updated Mar. 11, 2010) [http://perma.cc/GNC8-2VQ8] 
(archived Mar. 8, 2014). 
 150. Parker v. Parker, 517 So. 2d 264, 265 (La. Ct. App. 1987). See also 
discussion supra accompanying note 68. 
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A. Judicial Solution: Applying the Reasoning of Parker v. Parker 
In Parker, the court focused on the notion that, although the 
interest on the mortgage loan resulted from a separate obligation, the 
non-debtor spouse was not entitled to reimbursement of the interest 
because he benefited from the use of the property.151 Louisiana’s 
courts should apply similar logic in analyzing reimbursement claims 
for student loan debts, primarily because the same focus can be 
applied by analogy to such claims. 
The court in Parker noted that the community’s use of the 
separate property was “an enjoyment of the ‘natural and civil fruits’ 
of the separate property” and that the “cost of the benefit to the 
community included the payment of interest.”152 Although it is true 
that a degree is not considered property in Louisiana,153 the courts’ 
focus in mortgage cases is not on the property but on the enjoyment 
and use of the thing.154 In fact, by allowing the community to use 
the separate property, the debtor spouse kept the community from 
having the expense of rent for another house.155 The result is that the 
community ultimately had more capital than it otherwise would 
have had.156 Similarly, the debtor spouse’s student loan provides 
him or her with the opportunity to earn more money and thus that 
separate debt eventually leads to the community obtaining more 
money than it would have had.157 In both cases, the community (and 
therefore the non-debtor spouse) gets the benefits of the revenue 
gained as a result of the debtor spouse’s increased earning capacity 
resulting from the education he or she acquired with debts. 
Thus, one solution to the inequity in allowing reimbursement 
claims for student loan debt is for courts to apply by analogy the 
“consideration of benefit” logic to circumstances in which student 
loan debt is acquired prior to marriage. Doing so would establish a 
jurisprudential rule that student loan debt benefits the community as 
the business cost of maintaining and using the civil fruits of the 
separate property, and as such the non-debtor spouse is not entitled 
to reimbursement. Though such a solution would certainly lessen the 
inequity in allowing reimbursement claims for student loan debt, it 
still leaves room for inconsistent results if left strictly to the 
discretion of the judiciary. 
                                                                                                             
 151. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 152. Parker, 517 So. 2d at 265. 
 153. Gessner v. Gessner, 614 So. 2d 307, 309 (La. Ct. App. 1993). 
 154. See discussion supra accompanying note 68. 
 155. See Hurta v. Hurta, 260 So. 2d 324, 327 (La. Ct. App. 1972). 
 156. Id. 
 157. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 25. 
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B. A Legislative Proposal 
Drafting new legislation that expressly deals with the issue of 
student loan debt would likely be the most effective resolution to the 
reimbursement claim dilemma. New legislation would provide more 
consistent results and accurately reflect both equity and societal 
expectations regarding marriage and student loan debt.158 Several 
other community property states provide legislation that either deals 
specifically with the issue of student loan debt or at least codifies 
equitable considerations.159 The most insightful legislation comes 
from Texas and California after which the Louisiana Legislature 
should model an amendment to article 2364.160 
1. Using Texas as a Model for Revision 
Texas’s pertinent law focuses entirely on equity, a principle that 
seems lost on Louisiana’s Legislature with regard to reimbursement 
claims. Under section 7.007 of the Texas Family Code, the court 
“shall apply equitable principles” to “determine whether to recognize 
the claim [for reimbursement] after taking into account all the relative 
circumstances of the spouses” and to “order a division of the claim 
for reimbursement, if appropriate, in a manner that the court 
                                                                                                             
 158. See discussion supra Part III.B–C. 
 159. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.007 (West 2006); see also CAL. FAM. 
CODE § 2641 (West 2004). 
 160. Some community property states use a system of equitable distribution, 
and others employ a system of equal division. WILLIAM A. REPPY, JR. & CYNTHIA 
A. SAMUEL, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 476 (2004). In an 
equitable distribution system, both spouses are entitled to their fair share of the 
profits of the marriage, allowing for the possibility of unequal division. BRETT R. 
TURNER, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 1:1 (3d ed. 2011). Further, 
equitable distribution applies only in cases of divorce. Equal division focuses on 
an equivalent division of the assets. See REPPY & SAMUEL, supra, at 476. 
Additionally, equal division controls property ownership for the duration of the 
marriage, as well as property distribution at death and divorce. Id. The most 
important distinction between the systems lies in their uses of judicial discretion. 
Id. Equitable distribution implies a large amount of discretion—the court divides 
the couple’s assets according to general community property laws but can make 
additional equitable considerations. Id. In an equal division state like Louisiana, 
there is little room for equitable considerations by the judge if they are not written 
into the law itself. Id. Though Texas law fits under the system of equitable 
distribution, the considerations that it employs in determining whether to award 
reimbursement are nevertheless helpful to achieve equitable and just results and 
are therefore relevant considerations in revising Louisiana law. 
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considers just and right, having due regard for the rights of each 
party and any children of the marriage.”161 
Under this provision, the Texas Legislature suggests that 
different debts should be treated differently, depending upon the 
circumstances in which they are acquired. The Louisiana Legislature 
should take note of Texas’s careful consideration of equitable 
principles in light of the circumstances of a particular case. Doing so 
would allow for reimbursement claims where appropriate but forbid 
applying the blanket provision of the current version of article 2364 
in cases where the non-debtor spouse benefited from the 
opportunities resulting from the debt to the extent that allowing 
reimbursement would be unjust. Though the community property 
system employed by Texas, giving judges a great deal of discretion, 
differs somewhat from the system used in Louisiana, it is 
nonetheless a useful model for dealing with the issue of student loan 
debt.162 
2. Using California as a Model for Revision 
While Texas’s law provides some guidance as to the 
reimbursement claim issue, California’s Family Code provides the 
best solution to the inequity caused by allowing reimbursement for 
student loan debt in a context that fits squarely within the 
community property system applied in Louisiana. Like Louisiana, 
California employs a system of equal division, meaning that at the 
end of the community property regime, each spouse is a co-owner of 
one-half of the community assets.163 Section 2641 of the California 
Family Code deals directly with community contributions to 
education.164 The provision, in pertinent part, reads as follows: 
The community shall be reimbursed for community 
contributions to education or training of a party that 
substantially enhances the earning capacity of the party . . . . 
The reimbursement and assignment required by this section 
shall be reduced or modified to the extent circumstances 
render such a disposition unjust, including, but not limited 
to, any of the following: 
 
The community has substantially benefited from the 
education, training, or loan incurred for the education or 
                                                                                                             
 161. TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 7.007, 3.402 (describing reimbursement claims 
generally) (2006). 
 162. See discussion supra note 160. 
 163. See discussion supra note 160. 
 164. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2641. 
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training of the party. There is a rebuttable presumption, 
affecting the burden of proof, that the community has not 
substantially benefited from community contributions to the 
education or training made less than 10 years before the 
commencement of the proceeding, and that the community 
has substantially benefited from community contributions to 
the education or training made more than 10 years before the 
commencement of the proceeding. 
 
The education or training received by the party is offset by 
the education or training received by the other party for 
which community contributions have been made . . . .165 
Essentially, under California law, a non-debtor spouse is 
allowed to file a reimbursement claim against the debtor spouse for 
funds contributed to a separate student loan debt; however, the 
ability to receive the award is limited to the extent that both 
spouses have benefited from the opportunities allowed by the 
debt.166 This provision demonstrates that California’s Legislature 
emphasizes the duration of the marriage, providing a rebuttable 
presumption that the spouses did not benefit from the community 
contribution to the debt if it was made less than ten years before 
the termination of the community property regime.167 
The text of the provision prohibits reimbursement when 
reimbursement would render an unjust disposition.168 Though the 
basic rule is that community contributions must be reimbursed, that 
right is limited to contributions made during the preceding ten years 
“to minimize . . . potential inequity.”169 The California Legislature’s 
revision comments make it clear that its focus is not on whether the 
debt was obtained as a separate or community debt, but rather 
whether the community ultimately benefited from the debt: 
[I]f one party receives a[n] . . . education, degree, and license 
at community expense, but the marriage endures for some 
time with a high standard of living and substantial 
accumulation of community assets attributable to the . . . 
training, it may be inappropriate to require reimbursement.170 
                                                                                                             
 165. Id. (emphasis added). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. law revision commission cmts. 
 170. Id. 
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This situation is exactly the kind that Louisiana law has failed to 
account for and perfectly exemplifies the need to revise the current 
law. 
 3. A Practical Solution 
Louisiana Civil Code article 2364 should be revised to instill 
equity and societal expectations into the law dealing with 
reimbursement claims for student loan debt. The revision of article 
2364 must take into account the increased earning capacity of the 
debtor spouse that occurs almost solely as a result of the student loan 
debt, as well as the higher standard of living and the accumulation of 
community assets attributable to that higher earning potential.171 To do 
so, the Louisiana Legislature should consider drafting a revision of 
Article 2364 that reads as follows: 
Art. 2364. Satisfaction of separate obligation with community 
property or former community property 
 
If community property has been used during the existence of 
the community property regime or former community property 
has been used thereafter to satisfy a separate obligation of a 
spouse, the other spouse is entitled to reimbursement for one-
half of the amount or value that the property had at the time it 
was used. 
 
Nevertheless, the reimbursement required by this article shall 
be reduced, modified, or extinguished to the extent such 
circumstances render a disposition unjust, such as situations in 
which the community has substantially benefited from the 
education, training, or debt incurred for the education or 
training of the party.172 
By forcing courts to consider whether the community benefited 
from the debtor spouse’s acquisition of the debt, the Legislature would 
solve the inequities that exist in the present version of article 2364 and 
better conform to today’s social realities of student loan debt and 
marriage.173 Defining a “substantial benefit” would be left to the courts 
and would ideally focus on the duration of the marriage, the impact the 
                                                                                                             
 171. In fact, under the California provision, the revision comments note that 
the consideration of a higher earning capacity does not require “that the party 
actually work in an occupation to which the enhancement applies.” See id. 
 172. The italicized portion designates the changes to article 2364 proposed by 
the author. 
 173. See discussion supra Part I.A. 
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acquisition of the debt ultimately had on the debtor spouse’s earning 
capacity, and the couple’s standard of living during the marriage. 
This Comment’s proposed version of article 2364 exemplifies 
precisely what the article was undoubtedly aiming to accomplish but 
failed to achieve: an article based in equity.174 The proposed revision 
would not eliminate reimbursement claims for student loan debt 
entirely. Rather, the revision would allow such claims when the 
marriage was of such short duration that the non-debtor spouse had no 
chance to enjoy the benefit of the debtor spouse’s increased earning 
capacity. However, the revision would also protect debtor spouses from 
essentially paying their loan debt one-and-a-half times in situations 
where their spouses enjoyed the fruits of the debt. Additionally, the 
Legislature could choose to adopt other characteristics of California’s 
statute should it prefer more concrete parameters for reimbursement 
claims.175 Such a provision provides balanced, equitable results while 
accurately portraying what society would expect when entering into a 
marriage in which one or both spouses have student loan debt. 
CONCLUSION 
Under current Louisiana Civil Code article 2364, a prospective 
spouse with student loan debt should exercise a bit more caution when 
considering that walk down the aisle. Under the current law, bitter ex-
spouses can demand repayment of half the value of the payments made 
toward their spouse’s student loan debt, despite the fact that they may 
have enjoyed numerous advantages as a result of the loan. Moreover, 
an angry spouse could potentially be allowed double, or even triple, 
recovery in the wake of a nasty divorce. 
Though a plethora of problems may arise as a result of 
reimbursement claims, the most daunting issue is the high level of 
inequity that generally occurs as a result. As such, Louisiana must 
remedy this injustice, either jurisprudentially or, preferably, 
legislatively. Doing so would be consistent with Louisiana’s aim to 
achieve equity and would remove a non-debtor spouse’s ability to 
                                                                                                             
 174. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2055 (2014) (defining “equity” as the principle 
that “no one is allowed to take unfair advantage of another and that no one is 
allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another”). 
 175. For example, Louisiana’s Legislature might choose to adopt presumptions 
similar to those implemented by California. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 2641 (West 
2004). The presumption maintains the equity standard because it allows the non-
debtor spouse to at least have that presumption in his favor. However, it still 
remains equitable to the debtor spouse because, practically speaking, the 
presumption will likely not be difficult to overcome when the non-debtor spouse 
has enjoyed a higher standard of living and countless benefits as a result of the 
debtor spouse’s higher income. 
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recover funds contributed to student loan debts acquired prior to the 
marriage to the extent that he or she benefited from those loans through 
an increased standard of living. The end result is two-fold: law that 
reflects both the preservation of equity and the normal expectations of 
society. 
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